The federal government's announcement this week that it will bring home our six super hornet strike aircraft from the Middle East marks the end of Australia's air-strike operations in Iraq and Syria. It recognises that stage one of our latest Middle East commitment, which began in September 2014 and focussed on destroying Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, is complete.
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Australian support aircraft will continue to operate in the Middle East, as will the Australian Army's training mission.
Our commitment under what Defence calls "Operation OKRA" comprises about 680 Defence Force personnel making up the Air Task Group based at Al Minhad Air Base in the United Arab Emitrates, and the Special Operations Task Group and Task Group Taji, both based in Iraq.
About 300 personnel are assigned to the air group, 80 to special operations and 300 to Taji.
Task Group Taji is a combined Australian-New Zealand military training force north-west of Baghdad, with the role of training the regular Iraqi Security Forces. The ADF and New Zealand troops operated in a non-combat role. However, because the area is not secure, force-protection elements are included.
The 300 ADF personnel are drawn largely from the army's 3rd Brigade, and work alongside about 110 New Zealand personnel.
Our Taji commitment could also be wound down now. It was supposed to be a two-year commitment ending this year, then subject to review. A predecessor was the Australian Army Training Team Iraq, which served from May 2004 to June 2008. Both organisations did a good job turning out competent infantry soldiers, but they graduate to Iraqi units with poor commanders and low morale, so the effort is largely wasted.
It would make more sense for us to focus on training middle-ranking and senior Iraqi officers. As the numbers would be a lot smaller, we could do that most effectively in Australia. We could also run "train-the-trainer" programs in Australia.
The involvement of our Special Operation Task Group in mentoring the Iraq's Counter-Terrorism Service (Iraq's special forces) has been well worthwhile, and continues to pay dividends. Most of the heavy lifting in recovering Mosul and other northern towns from Islamic States was due to the dedication of those forces. In the process, they suffered 50 per cent casualties. The Counter-Terrorism Service needs to be restored and rebuilt to keep pressure on Islamic States and prevent it from becoming a significant problem again in rural Iraq.
The OKRA mission is being conducted ostensibly at the Iraqi government's request, but it seems more likely to be the United States that is pushing for our continued commitment.
The government in Baghdad has said on several occasions it does not want Western troops in Iraq. It made it difficult for us to establish our Taji training program and would not allow the US-led coalition to base strike aircraft in Iraq, even after Islamic State occupied Mosul. This meant we had to air-refuel the super hornets for the long round trip from the UAE to targets in northern Iraq and back again.
Incidentally, the connection between our Air Task Group and the UAE could have motivated the alleged attempt to bring down an Etihad flight out of Sydney in July 2017, as that would have punished both Australia and the UAE for their part in destroying the Islamic State caliphate in Iraq and Syria.
Iraq has now moved from the "destruction of Islamic State stage" to a "consolidation, reconciliation and reconstruction stage".
The most effective way we can contribute now is to deploy Australian Army engineers with protection elements to places like Mosul, and to train and mentor local army and civil engineers in post-combat roles, such as disposing of explosive ordnance, neutralisng improvised bombs, clearing roads, building bridges and restoring key services such as power, water, communications and sewerage.
We do not, of course, need to do this alone. It should be part of a cooperative effort with the US and NATO.
After all, if the destroyed town and cities are not restored, the former residents will remain in refugee camps until they can get placed in a Western country, and most will want to go to western Europe or countries like Australia. There is no point in our paying Iraqis to do this work because, in a country as corrupt as Iraq, the money will simply disappear into organisers' pockets and the rebuilding work won't happen.
Clive Williams, a former army officer, is a visiting professor at the Australian National University's centre for military and security law and an adjunct professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy.
