It was the big debate that never happened during the recent election campaign. But just because we didn't talk about the huge new issues we're about to confront didn't mean they disappeared. They're still there - the problem is the old solutions won't cut it any more.
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New wars require new thinking, but we're still planning defence as if it's the year 2000.
Sure, today we're getting Joint Strike Fighters rather than F-18's; 'Future' frigates instead of ANZAC's; and Rheinmetall armoured vehicles to replace antiquated LRV's, but these are just modern variants of old thinking; better ways of accomplishing an outdated job.
It's like building a new printing press when the internet's carrying news on-line. It doesn't cut it any more.
Our current weapons were dreamed up back in the days of 386 computers (if you don't know what that means, ask your grandfather). New weaponry is now upending the old calculus of battle.
Yes, we're ready to defeat a conventional assault or contribute to international operations . . . within tight and restricted parameters.
What we don't have - and aren't even discussing - is a new force ready for the emerging challenges of the future. We're being left behind.
Keeping this issue off the media agenda was a quite deliberate strategy for Labor. The opposition's regarded as "flaky" on defence and certainly not as serious about it as the conservative government. That may, or may not be true.
What nobody can contest, however, is that when Stephen Smith was Defence Minister spending on the military abruptly haemorrhaged to close to its lowest ever levels.
The problem wasn't just that spending was slashed. Doing this was necessary. It liberated funds to pad out the budget elsewhere.
Labor promised to find money for the services somewhere "down the track".
The problem was it didn't - perhaps couldn't - explain when this extra funding might kick in, what it would be spent on, or how to craft a plan to adequately defend the country. The field was wide open for a political attack.
Christopher Pyne had a field day.
He realised he could wrest political capital from Labor by beefing up the equipment inventory. He waded in hard - too hard.
We're now committed, indefinitely, to a ship-building program churning out future frigates whether we need them or not; a $50 billion submarine program that's now well and truly sailed away; and massive amounts of dedicated funding going to Joint Strike Fighters.
Anything left over is going to be spent on armoured vehicles. The problem is there's no room left for the future.
Pyne did his job too well.
Locking in such spending squandered the Coalition's political advantage.
All Labor has to say was, "me too", (as it did) and defence disappears as a political issue.
Opposition spokesman Richard Marles simply neutralised the issue. Even if the electorate didn't really think he'd find the money, he left the government with nowhere to go by signing up to their program.
But the huge danger left unaddressed was technological change.
The danger is much of our money will be spent on obsolescent stuff when missiles - and developments with nuclear weapons - are transforming war.
In the past we learned to live with the possibility of nuclear Armageddon.
Everyone knew Russia and the US had the ability to destroy the world many times over. Fortunately, nobody was stupid enough to test the other side in a world where the inevitable result would be total destruction.
Today, however, weapons are changing, and that's why the superpowers are now abandoning the arms control measures that have held the balance of terror in place for the past half century.
The first problem is proliferation.
New countries that don't subscribe to the diplomatic regimes that have provided security are obtaining nuclear weapons, and this is a major concern.
The balance of terror between the USA and USSR held for more than 50 years, but we can't necessarily rely on its replica holding up between Israel and Iraq, India and Pakistan.
The geography is different; the countries are closer; stakes higher and timing shorter. The chances for error are greater.
Secondly there's technology.
Nuclear weapons used to be about destroying cities - that was as close as you could get to being confident they'd do their job. Today it's possible to target a particular room in the West Wing in the White House.
Hypersonic technology and multiple warheads means its virtually impossible to stop a pinpoint attack; new developments in bomb-making mean smaller, more destructive weapons exist that are radically transforming the range of military possibilities.
The trouble is you wouldn't know any of this if you rely on either our political debate or the last Defence White Paper.
That's not to say we need a new one, or a sudden radical change of strategy, but the key point is things are changing. Fast.
Unfortunately you wouldn't know this if you relied on political discussion and debate to tell you what's going on.
The challenge has arrived for the political class.
The sad reality is that while we've been happy talking about building boats, planes and tanks the world around us has changed dramatically.
We need to develop our thinking for this new world quickly.
There's more than enough for our new Defence Minister to be getting on with. I wish Linda Reynolds the best of luck - she'll need it.
- Nicholas Stuart is a Canberra writer.
Nicholas Stuart
Nicholas Stuart is a Canberra writer.
Nicholas Stuart is a Canberra writer.
