While greyzone warfare becomes the theatre of choice for adversaries like China and Russia, Australia's defence spend remains reliant on traditional forms of combat from decades past those used fighting the last war.
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We risk leaving ourselves vulnerable.
While staples such as armoured vehicles, frigates and submarines are necessary, budgets need to be balanced with new and more advanced technologies to protect us in the new era of warfare.
There's evidence aplenty from the Ukraine war, where Iranian Shahed drones - which can carry 40 kilograms of payload each - do extraordinary damage yet are almost disposable by military standards at US$20,000 apiece. Similarly, Armenia's lack of defences against Turkish TB2 drones used by Azerbaijan shaped that particular conflict. These are two prolific examples of why it is critical to adjust and evolve.
The threat extends to our homeland. Until we reach a point where there is targeted investment to protect against asymmetric and electronic warfare, our power grids, data centres, satellites and undersea cables will all be in the firing line from hypersonic weapons, drones carrying equipment to hack and steal critical military assets and data, and other tools adversaries have.
The threat is also expansive, and malicious actors are constantly figuring out new ways to use devices like drones to disrupt and damage. This includes even off-the-shelf versions, such as DJI Mavics and Phantoms which have both been used extensively in Ukraine by both sides.
Although we have crucial allies, we need to focus on our own priorities. America's defence strategy relies on first-strike; ours currently relies on America.
That type of over-reliance leaves us where we were in Singapore in 1942 (when the British never arrived to defend against the Japanese); history has told us repeatedly we need a home-grown defence strategy to protect our own interests. Importantly, Australia is not part of NATO, even if we partake in NATO wars, so there is not even an obligation, technically, for others to come to our aid.
![Defence Minister Richard Marles. Picture by Elesa Kurtz Defence Minister Richard Marles. Picture by Elesa Kurtz](/images/transform/v1/crop/frm/pMXRnDj3SUU44AkPpn97sC/645f3d2c-1c3f-4345-b029-5f9ef08cdc2d.jpg/r0_148_5568_3291_w1200_h678_fmax.jpg)
Real contracts for asymmetric threats, not gimmicks
While the ADF invests substantially in robotics - ghost gobotics dogs are at just about every trade show, alongside a slew of other unmanned ground vehicles - there is a lack of investment into significant changes spanning cyber security, protecting soft targets, and advanced technology areas and electronic warfare, like counterdrone.
We need to get past gimmicks vying for government grants - it's too short-sighted. To grow our defence tech capabilities and be a world leader, real government contracts are needed.
Additionally, and learning from the US, we should consider funding options for defence companies linked to their performance with ADF, similar to In-Q-Tel's role as the venture capital arm of the CIA for the companies with which it does business.
As it stands, funding and procurement channels are missing even though, at the working level of the ADF, there is an understanding it's needed.
We have had a significant number of ADF personnel, at various levels, and groups expressing their concerns over drone security, and trying to cut through the red tape and get the equipment. In the meantime, they are left spotting drones moving through domestic military air space with limited capacity to handle it - worse yet, they don't always whether some go unnoticed.
It is currently unclear who is in charge of evaluating counterdrone capability or who is responsible for funding it, but the view expressed by the same personnel is the urgent need to stand up a separate, major program funding advanced capabilities, similar to programs that currently fund robotics kits.
Part of the challenge is the broad relevance of counterdrone technologies. Applications span programs like LAND 400 (armoured vehicles), Abrams tanks, LAND 125 (soldier systems), LAND 8710 (littoral vessels) and even the larger programs like AIR 6500 (Joint Air Battle Management System). Each of these need counterdrone capabilities, but with limited funding for each program, the requirement needs to essentially be at a cost of something else within any given program).
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Given the prevalence of drones and other advanced threats, Australia stands to see substantial benefits from dedicated, standalone programs for counterdrone and asymmetric capabilities from the office of Defence Minister Richard Marles.
Aside from counterdrone, other high-tech defence areas where we already have world-leading smarts but need to foster more government contracts include Ocius and its persistent maritime surveillance Bluebottle robotic ships, Silentium and Darenmont with passive radars, and Mellori with electronic warfare, among others.
The Albanese government has outlined its plans to review cost and time overruns on large programs. While those programs are necessary, Australia can overcome ongoing cost and time issues while still chipping away at building home-grown capabilities with smaller, but just as important, programs, such as those geared to asymmetric and electronic warfare.
We can never outspend the likes of China, so our emphasis must be on smart programs with a disproportionate and asymmetric impact, alongside sovereign high tech research and development in electronic warfare and advanced capabilities.
- Oleg Vornik is chief executive officer at Australian company DroneShield.