Public Sector Informant | Russell Ayres: Robodebt royal commission will have important lessons for public service

It is of course crucial to investigate what happened and why, and who was responsible. To paraphrase Commissioner Catherine Holmes, we need to know if the initial and very flawed policy process was a stuff-up or a conspiracy, and whether the subsequent persistence with the program was a conspiracy to conceal a stuff-up.

There is, however, also the question of the future. In the words of the royal commission's letters patent, what "measures [are] needed to prevent a recurrence of any failures of public administration"?

We've seen this movie before. Back in 2007, the then Commonwealth Ombudsman, Professor John McMillan published 10 lessons based on his office's investigation of some truly shocking immigration detention cases. A sequel hit our screens in 2015, when Dr Peter Shergold produced his Learning from failure report, based on the royal commission into the home insulation program. His 28 proposals addressed such matters as providing robust policy advice, making clear, supported decisions, and having an effective risk culture.

It is very likely most if not all the senior public servants involved in robodebt had read MacMillan and Shergold, just as they knew their obligations under the Public Service Act 1999 to provide advice that is "frank, honest and timely".

And yet the evidence to date would suggest that some officials did not act in accordance with either the letter nor certainly the spirit of any of these guides. (It remains to be seen what degree of culpability the commission might find accrues to ministers or their staff.)

Young public servants could be forgiven for wondering if the APS is capable of learning, even from something as scarifying as this royal commission. I hope and believe it can. It is too important an institution for it to do otherwise. But it is going to take a concerted and sustained effort.

So, what might the lessons of robodebt be? It is too early to be definitive, but here are a few first draft thoughts.

First, structures and governance matter. The split of welfare policy and its administration between the Departments of Social Services and Human Services was always going to be problematic.

But whatever choices are made around organisational structures, the governance of those structures need to take into account and as far as possible compensate for the weaknesses of the structural choices made.

The evidence to date clearly shows that interactions between the two departments were ad hoc and too informal, leaving great play for the influence of personalities and office politics, even when dealing with highly sensitive and contentious issues.

Second, recordkeeping matters. Yes, it is boringly bureaucratic, but making a note of aconversation with another official or a minister, or confirming an agreement via a quick email can save a world of grief later on. Even more importantly, it is a form of transparency.

Even an confidential document is still a document. It is a physical manifestation of official action and reminds the writer that what they do is able to be scrutinised. It externalises what is otherwise far too casual and ephemeral. It is part of the public servant's stewardship role.

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Third, general expectations as well as specific directions need to be articulated and documented. Coming through much of the evidence at the royal commission has been a sense that officials have assumed their superiors - whether they are other public servants or ministers - have certain expectations or wishes, even when these have not been fully or explicitly stated. It is not enough for a minister to say he wants to be a "welfare cop".

He needs to detail for departmental officials exactly what that means and what parameters for policy and action it implies.

The same goes for the bureaucratic hierarchy. If a direction is a direction, then it should be expressed as a direction, not a suggestion or a vague musing.

It is a discussion that in a very real sense can have no ending. The creation of a professional and effective public service is a neverending task, like painting Sydney Harbour Bridge.

Robodebt has been traumatic for all those involved, especially the clients grievously accused of cheating the system. If the nation has to pay this price, then it needs to get full value, in the form of learning the lessons and instituting real and lasting reforms in government.