Will the Gaza violence spill over into Australia?

At the same time, states sympathetic to the Palestinians, such as Turkiye, will probably target Mossad operatives and put pressure on their Jewish communities because of the heavy loss of Muslim lives in Gaza.

However, it's unlikely that Hamas (or Hezbollah) will want to conduct out-of-area terrorist attacks - except perhaps against Israeli embassies - because their primary target is Israel. Additionally, Hamas won't want to lose the international sympathy generated by the death of more than 24,000 Palestinians in Gaza, mostly civilians. (Israel claims that 9,000 of them were Hamas fighters.)

That likely restraint is not true of jihadist terrorist groups Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, who are both actively encouraging their followers to mount terrorist attacks in Western countries in support of the Palestinians.

The reaction in Australia to the Israeli-Hamas conflict has been varied.

Propagandists for Israel are supporting everything Israel has done in "self-defence", while other Jewish Australians seem to be supporting some Israeli actions and not others. I suspect that few Jewish Australians (like most Israelis) are fans of unpopular Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Members of other Australian communities were no doubt horrified by the Hamas-led massacres on October 7, but are now more sympathetic towards the Palestinians because of the heavy loss of civilian lives in Gaza (including 8,000 children, according to the UN). They are also concerned about Israeli settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, and empathise with the Palestinians' desire for their own state.

Hamas itself is something of a paradox. It became the legitimate governing authority in Gaza in 2007 following its electoral victory, but maintains a large military wing (of some 40,000 Hamas fighters) that engages in violence against Israel. In its governance role, "political and social" Hamas operates schools, hospitals, and charities, providing essential services to the local population. But it's also known for political repression and limiting freedom of expression.

Militarily, Hamas has continually engaged in conflict with Israel, mostly through the launching of inaccurate rockets into Israel. Its actions have contributed to cycles of violence and been a major obstacle to achieving a sustainable peace. Hamas's use of violence has even been a point of contention among Palestinians, with some arguing that it has been counterproductive and is not an effective way forward.

Another militant group, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, (with around 1,000 members) is also active in Gaza - mainly in launching rocket attacks against Israel.

Hamas's stance over a two-state solution has evolved over time. Historically, its charter rejected the existence of the state of Israel and called for the liberation of all Palestinian territories. However, there have been instances where Hamas leaders have indicated a willingness to consider a long-term ceasefire and two-state solution.

In 2017, Hamas released a new policy document that softened its language, stating a willingness to accept a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, although it fell short of explicitly recognising Israel.

Achieving a two-state solution has remained a complex challenge. The broader political landscape involves not only Hamas but also other Palestinian factions, Israel, and the international community - particularly the US as Israel's protector. To complicate matters, many Israelis are American citizens, including around 60,000 in the occupied West Bank settlements.

The persistent issues of borders, right of return of Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlement building in the occupied West Bank, the status of Jerusalem, and Palestinian and Israeli security concerns, continue to be points of contention. Netanyahu has always been supportive of settlement expansion - which is a major ongoing source of tension.

The Israeli government has always been sceptical about the ability of the Palestinian leadership to guarantee Israel's security in any two-state arrangement, particularly in the context of Hamas's close relationship with Israel's regional arch-rival Iran.

The Hamas-led mass terrorist attack on October 7 seemed intended to underline Palestinian grievances, try to get the international community involved in settlement talks, and undermine Israel's attempts to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states that would have sidelined the Palestinians.

The Hamas preparation of tunnels and defended areas in Gaza, and hostage-taking, were intended to make it as costly and difficult as possible for the IDF to regain control of Gaza - and that's certainly proving to be the case.

A seldom-mentioned ticking time bomb is the demographic issue. The US estimates there are three million Palestinians in the West Bank and two million in Gaza. That compares with 670,000 Israelis. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated that by the end of 2022, "the number of Palestinians and Jews (living between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River) would be equal at about 7.1 million each". If correct, this would be an added concern for Israel as Palestinian families tend to be larger than Jewish families.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu has been prepared to do whatever it takes to hold on to political power, avoid corruption accountability, and duck responsibility for the disastrous security lapse on his watch.

In conclusion, the likelihood is for a lot more death and destruction in Gaza, another round of probably inconclusive settlement talks in due course, the weakening - but not elimination - of Hamas, and the stage set for more violence in the future.

Australia should be able to contain any violence here generated by the situation in the Middle East. It would however be prudent to distance ourselves from the conflict by limiting Australian defence sales to Israel and discouraging Australians from fighting for Hamas and the IDF.